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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Different  aspects  of  recognition  memory  in  rodents  are  commonly  assessed  using  variants  of the  sponta-
neous  object  recognition  procedure  in  which  animals  explore  objects  that  differ  in terms  of  their  novelty,
recency,  or  where  they  have  previously  been  presented.  The  present  article  describes  three  standard
variants  of  this  procedure,  and  outlines  a  theory  of  associative  learning,  SOP  [1] which  can  offer  an  expla-
nation  of performance  on  all three  types  of task.  The  implications  of  this  for theoretical  interpretations
of  recognition  memory  and  the  procedures  used  to  explore  it are  discussed.eywords:
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We  may  take recognition memory as being the discrimination
etween novel and familiar events [2–4]. It has been popular to
xamine recognition memory in rodents by capitalising on their
endency to approach and explore novel or unexpected objects in
reference to familiar or expected objects [5,6]. Systematic varia-
ions in this procedure have encouraged particular accounts of the
sychological processes underlying object recognition: Ennaceur Delacour [7] (see also [8,9]) parsimoniously describe memory as
he habituation of an approach response towards an object with
ncreased exposure; Aggleton and Brown [10] maintain that it is
Abbreviations: A1, primary state of stimulus element activity in SOP; A2, primed
r  secondary state of activity in SOP; CS, conditioned stimulus or signal; US, uncon-
itioned stimulus or outcome.
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166-4328/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).based on a sense of familiarity towards an object that is built up
through exposure to it (see also [2,11]); Cowell, Bussey, and Sak-
sida [12] describe a multi-layer connectionist network that allows
recognition to occur as in the natural course of the building of
stimulus representations and several authors have suggested that
rodents’ recognition memory represents a relatively sophisticated
form of mnemonic process [13,14].
In this report we  describe an alternative psychological account
of recognition memory, which is based on Brandon, Vogel, & Wag-
ner’s model [15], SOP (Standard Operating Procedures; [16–18]).
SOP is primarily a model of associative learning, but unlike some
others [19] incorporates a conceptualisation of memory. We  argue
here that this feature of SOP allows it to accommodate much of what
is known about rodents’ object recognition and show that it has
generated predictions that have been experimentally supported.
SOP has produced successful accounts of many phenomena (e.g.,
habituation [3,20,21], associative learning, discrimination learning)
and if its account of object recognition were accepted, it would
strengthen its position as a general-purpose model of adaptive
behaviour.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Fig. 1. Object recognition experimental designs. Experimental designs for three,
key types of object recognition procedure: spontaneous object recognition, relative
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wecency and object-in-context. P and Q refer to distinctly different objects; x and
 refer to distinctly different contexts. The inequality signs indicate the object that
licits the most approach behaviour.
. Object recognition in non-human animals
.1. General procedural features and experimental considerations
Spontaneous object recognition [7,22–25], relative recency
13,26–31] and object-in-context [32–38] are terms given to three
f the most popular procedures for looking at object memory in
odents (see Fig. 1). We  describe each in turn, before discussing an
ssociative model of memory, SOP, [15] that can provide a satis-
actory explanation of performance on these three tasks, and also
enerate novel, testable predictions.
All three procedures involve the placement of a rodent in one or
ore experimental contexts along with one or more objects; unlike
atching- and non-matching-to-sample procedures for studying
emory [39–41], food reinforcement is not used in these tasks.
xperimental contexts vary in complexity, from being a single
ndecorated wooden box to pairs of contexts differentiated in their
oors and/or walls. The experimental objects are often domes-
ic items (bottles, vases, etc.) that are selected to be difﬁcult for
odents to knock over, chew or sit upon, behaviours that could
asily contaminate the measured behaviour. The three tasks differ
rincipally in the preexposure that rodents receive (which is fully
escribed below). For example, in spontaneous object recognition
ne object, P, is preexposed. In all three tasks, test performance
nvolves the simultaneous presentation of a pair of different objects
P and Q), which have been treated differently earlier in the pro-
edure (but see [42]). The experimenter will measure differences
n the amounts of behaviour directed towards objects P and Q.
his may  either be speciﬁc exploratory responses [32,33] or entry
nto notional zones that surround each object [31,43,44]. In spon-
aneous object recognition, approach to P is depressed relative to
 on test [26,33] and decreases over the course of pre-exposure
20,45].
Interpretation of a difference in behaviour towards objects P and
 requires appropriate experimental management. For example, it
s essential to counterbalance the objects serving as P and Q (e.g.,
alf of the rodents have a bottle as P and a vase as Q; the remaining
odents receive the reverse arrangement) as well as their positions
ithin the context (e.g., half of the rodents receive object P on the
eft of object Q; the remaining rodents receive the reverse arrange-
ent). It is also necessary to ensure that the two objects do not
iffer in their marking (e.g., by odour cues), which may  be achieved
ither by cleaning or replacing them after use.
.2. Three types of object recognition taskIn a spontaneous object recognition experiment [7,22–25],
odents receive a pre-exposure trial with object P before testing
ith P and a novel object, Q. Q is approached in preference to P onrain Research 285 (2015) 1–9
testing. Typically two versions of a single object (here, P) are pre-
exposed so that the arrangement of objects in the context during
preexposure matches that during testing. Just as in delayed non-
matching to sample [46–49], in spontaneous object recognition
the interval between pre-exposure and testing can be extended to
reduce test discrimination [50–52].
This temporal dynamic of the interval between preexposure
and test is explicitly manipulated in the relative recency procedure
[13,26–31]. Here two  pre-exposure trials precede testing: the ﬁrst
is with P; the second with Q. On test, rodents approach P more
than Q, demonstrating better memory of the more recently pre-
sented Q. The interval between the two pre-exposure trials and
the interval between the second pre-exposure trial and test will
emerge later as important considerations in the evaluation of the
associative analysis of object memory.
Like the relative recency procedure, the object-in-context pro-
cedure involves the separate pre-exposure of both objects P and Q
before the test. The difference is that pre-exposure to each object
occurs in a distinctly different context: Object P in context x and
object Q in context y. Greater approach towards Q than P is found
when testing occurs in context x [32–38]; and, of course, testing
may  be given in context y in which approach is biased towards
P. The particular sequence of pre-exposure trials (xP before yQ or
the reverse) may  constitute a relative recency manipulation and
its implications for our evaluation of SOP are considered below
(Section 3.4.3).
2.3. Brain areas associated with these three types of object
recognition
Although our report is intended to consider a psychological-
level of analysis of recognition memory it is worthwhile to consider
brain areas that are associated with the three forms of object
recognition. Evidence of the importance of the perirhinal cortex
in spontaneous object recognition is excellent in that there are
many examples of its involvement (primarily from lesion studies
in rats) from a variety of labs (e.g., [22,23,28,37,45,49,53,54]) and,
as far as we  are aware, there are no claims of null ﬁndings. There
is also some evidence of involvement of prefrontal cortical regions
[28] but mixed ﬁndings of involvement of the hippocampus (e.g.,
with deﬁcits reported in some labs, e.g., [23,50], but not in others,
e.g., [35,38,55]). Fewer brain regions have been examined in rel-
ative recency procedures but there is abundant evidence for the
involvement of speciﬁc regions of the prefrontal cortex in rats (e.g.,
[27,28,56,13,57]) and, again of the perirhinal cortex and its connec-
tions with the prefrontal cortex (e.g., [28,13]). Object-in-context
learning has been demonstrated to be affected by manipulations
of the hippocampus (e.g., [35,38,55], see also [58] for evidence of
hippocampal involvement in an audio-visual analogue of object-
in-context learning) and the prefrontal cortex (e.g., [28,36]).
3. The SOP model of associative memory
3.1. Stimulus representation
According to Brandon et al.’s SOP model, all stimuli are rep-
resented by populations of stimulus elements that code for the
perception and memory of physical characteristics. Because such
elements may  only be present or absent on a trial they constitute
a binary code capable of describing a stimulus. For example, a pure
tone presented to a rat might have elements of a 2.0-kHz pitch and
a 65-dB (SPL) amplitude. This is, of course, a simpliﬁcation–many
more stimulus characteristics will be available for coding–but it is
sufﬁcient for this explanation. Through learning – for example, pair-
ing the tone with delivery of food – the elements comprising the
J. Robinson, C. Bonardi / Behavioural B
Fig. 2. Activity transitions of stimulus elements.
This ﬁgure is a still from a movie that is embedded in the PDF version of this
manuscript (see Appendix A). The movie represents the sequence of activity tran-
sition states in Brandon et al.’s SOP model. Three stimulus elements are initially in
an inactive state. Clicking the “Activate” button is analogous to the presentation of
a  stimulus to an organism, such as the presentation of a tone to a rat. The rat will
typically show a strong orienting response to the source of the tone (represented as,
“?!”), corresponding to the stimulus elements’ promotion to their A1 states of activ-
ity.  The elements are next “primed” (i.e., they enter an inferior A2 state of activity)
where they provoke weaker orienting responses. Finally, the elements re-enter their
inactive states where they do not provoke stimulus-speciﬁc behaviour. For compu-
tational reasons, Brandon et al. conceive of stimulus representations as comprising
much larger populations of elements than this; nonetheless the sequence in which
the stimulus elements pass through the various activation states is identical, and ele-
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associative learning. The rules are straightforward and represented
in Fig. 3: Excitatory associations will be formed between stimu-
lus elements whose elements are simultaneously in their A1 states
(ﬁrst rule); inhibitory associations will be formed from A1-state
Fig. 3. SOP’s rules for association change. According to the SOP  model (e.g., Brandon
et  al., [1]) stimulus representational elements may exist in two states of activity, A1
or  A2 (or in an inactive state, which is not represented here). When stimuli, or more
precisely, their elements, are active together, changes in associative strength may
occur. For example, the pairing of a tone and food delivery in an appetitive condi-
tion  experiment with rats will encourage excitatory changes in association (“→”),
which will promote the conditioned response. Early in training the tone and the
food will tend to be in their A1 states. Learning will reach asymptote (its maximum
level) because the tone’s excitatory association will prime the food into its A2 state
generating a portion of inhibitory strength change. Changes in excitation and inhi-
bition will balance at the asymptote. In feature-negative discriminations (also known
as  Pavlovian conditioned inhibition) a light might ﬁrst be established as a signal
for food. Later, the light may  be presented in compound with a tone but with no
subsequent food reinforcement. During these trials, the tone’s elements will largely
be  in their A1 states and the food’s elements will be in their A2 states, having been
associatively primed by the light. The co-occurrence of the tone’s A1 and the food’s
A2 states, produces the conditions necessary for the formation of tone-food inhi-
bition. In backward conditioning the arrangement of the tone and food is reversed
from that of standard Pavlovian conditioning–the food is presented just before the
tone. This arrangement will produce inhibition by decay-based priming because theents cannot pass directly from A2 back to A1. Thus presentation of the tone (i.e.,
licking “Activate”) when its elements are in their A2 state does not promote them
nto their A1 state: Entry into A1 state must come directly from the inactive state.
one representation would become associated with the represen-
ational elements that code for the food (with their own distinctive
oding properties relating to its smell, texture, etc.) Presentation
f the tone could produce food-related responding by activation of
he food stimulus elements via these inter-element associations.
oreover, presentation of a physically similar, but discriminably
ifferent, tone (e.g., one having a 1.8 Hz pitch with an amplitude,
gain, of 65 dB SPL) could also produce responding, albeit at a
educed level, to the extent that it shared one or more stimulus
lements with the tone used in training [59–61].
.2. Activity states, their transitions and behaviour
Hebb [62] described learning principles in which cell assemblies
which are notionally identical to stimulus elements in SOP) are
n either active or inactive states. Coincident periods of activity in
ell assemblies would promote the formation of excitatory associa-
ions. However, Hebb’s system fails to predict hallmark associative
earning phenomena such as blocking and relative validity [63,64].
ike Hebb’s model, SOP supposes that concurrently active stimulus
lements will support association formation (this will be outlined
elow in Section 3.3) but supposes the existence of two qualitatively
ifferent forms of activity.
A representation of a brief, 2.0-kHz tone’s stimulus elements
nd their transition through SOP’s activity states is summarised in
he HTML movie in Fig. 2. The tone’s elements begin in the inac-
ive state and they will not elicit any behaviour. Clicking the Action
utton corresponds to the presentation of the tone and this will
romote the tone’s elements into their primary form of activity (A1
tate) in which they will elicit behaviour. On initial presentation of
 tone, the rat will elicit a strong orienting response [9], for example
owards the loudspeaker and this is represented by the large hazard
ign, marked with “?!”. With sustained or repeated presentation,
he tone’s elements will fade into their secondary state of activity
A2 state) where they will elicit weaker orienting, which is repre-
ented by a smaller hazard sign marked with “?”. Elements in their
2 states are referred to as primed. After their period of A2 activity,
r priming, the elements decay to their inactive states and no longer
licit orienting. Three points are notable here: 1. The momentaryrain Research 285 (2015) 1–9 3
probability of each element’s transition from one state to the next
need not be uniform. This allows elements of a single stimulus to
inhabit different activity states at the same time; 2. A stimulus ele-
ment is assumed to be indivisible–it cannot inhabit more than one
activity state simultaneously; 3. Elements must pass into their A1
states via their inactive states, as we saw in the movie: They cannot
move directly from A2 to A1. Thus, for example, a second presenta-
tion of the tone while the elements are in their A2 states does not
return them to their A1 states.
Brandon et al. describe a second, associative route of priming in
SOP. Following successful associative learning, for example in an
appetitive conditioning procedure, a tone signal will generate A2
activity in the food outcome. That is, the presentation of the tone
generates A1 activity in its central representation, which primes the
food’s representation directly into the A2 state via the excitatory
association between them. Once primed, the food representation
provokes conditioned responding. SOP’s associative priming allows
it to accommodate many long-standing phenomena in animal dis-
crimination learning, such as blocking [64,65] and relative validity
[63] – in keeping with other models [19,60,66]. Associative priming
also allows SOP to correctly anticipate that associative learning will
reach an asymptote, a feature lacking in Hebb’s [62] model.
3.3. SOP’s rules for association formation
Having outlined SOP’s transition characteristics for stimulus
elements we are in the position to understand its four rules forfood’s representational elements may  decay into their A2 states by the time of the
tone’s presentation – thus arranging, again for the co-occurrence of the A1-tone and
A2-food activity necessary to foster tone-food inhibition. In the application of SOP
to  object-in-context learning, the object may be conceived of as analogous to the
food and the context, analogous to the tone.
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by SOP for Pavlovian conditioning (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) may
apply to other stimuli, including those used in object recognition
experiments with rodents. Although we  might conceive of the rep-
resentations of objects as being more complex than those of a pure
Fig. 4. Priming mechanisms in object recognition. The ﬁrst column represents the
experimental designs of the three forms of object recognition procedure (see Sec-
tion 2.2). The pipe character (“|”) represents separate training stages. P and Q refer
to  distinctly different objects; x and y refer to distinctly different contexts. The SOP
model of memory (e.g., Brandon et al.) speciﬁes two qualitatively different activity
states for stimulus representations: A primary state, A1, and a “primed” secondary
state, A2. Stimulus elements may be primed into A2 states either by decay (i.e.,
sometime after recent stimulus presentation) or by associative activation (i.e., fol-
lowing the presentation of a second, associated stimulus). Both processes could J. Robinson, C. Bonardi / Behavi
lements to A2-state elements (second rule) but no associations
ill be reciprocated (third rule). No associative changes will occur
mong A2-state elements (fourth rule). Future presentations of a
timulus will activate the representation of associated elements
ia excitatory associations into their A2 state; but inhibitory asso-
iations will prevent this, leaving the elements inactive. We next
utline circumstances in Pavlovian conditioned experiments where
OP assumes these associative changes take place.
In standard Pavlovian conditioning in which, for example,
odents receive a brief tone whose termination is coincidental with
elivery of a food pellet (Tone → Food; e.g., [67,68]), the pairing of
he tone and food will tend to promote their stimulus elements into
heir A1 states and this will support excitatory conditioning. SOP
redicts that the best condition for supporting associative change
s when stimulus elements are paired simultaneously but Pavlovian
onditioning procedures typically involves the serial pairing of the
ignal (or conditioned stimulus – CS) and outcome (or uncondi-
ioned stimulus – US). The reasons for this are merely practical:
ith serial signal → outcome pairings, measurement of respon-
ing to the CS is free of contamination from the unconditioned
esponses to the outcome. However, specially designed analytical
xperiments have found learning about simultaneously presented
timuli to be superior to learning about serially presented stimuli
69], the ﬁnding anticipated by SOP.
An inhibitory signal for an outcome (an inhibitor) will not pro-
uce distinct behaviour when tested directly in the way  that an
xcitatory signal will. Instead, inhibition is inferred from the results
f a pair of indirect tests for inhibition [70]. In “retardation tests”,
he inhibitor serves as a standard Pavlovian signal for the out-
ome following inhibition training. The acquisition of (excitatory)
onditioned responding to the inhibitor is slow relative to an
ppropriate control condition. The “summation test” involves the
uperimposition of the inhibitor on a previously established exci-
or for the same outcome. The inhibitor reduces the conditioned
esponse that is otherwise elicited by the excitor. Retardation and
ummation tests complement each other and many argue that both
ust be passed to claim that a stimulus is a true inhibitor [71].
“Backward conditioning” and “feature negative training” proce-
ures have both been found to produce inhibition by retardation
nd summation testing. A1-signal activity can be paired with A2-
utcome activity in Pavlovian conditioning when the “outcome”
recedes, rather than follows, the “signal” (i.e., outcome → signal
airings, or “backward conditioning”). When tested after train-
ng the signal may  produce negligible performance [72], which
OP would assume to be the result of a mixture of excitatory and
nhibitory signal-outcome learning caused by the A1-signal activ-
ty’s co-occurrence with the outcome’s elements as they decay from
1 to A2 activity states. With alterations in experimental param-
ters, it is possible for outcome → signal pairings to produce full
nhibitory learning in which the signal is found on test to suppress
ctivity in the outcome representation [72]. Here SOP will assume
hat there is greater co-occurrence of the outcome’s A2 state and
he signal’s A1 state than the outcome’s A1 state and the signal’s A1
tate. A commoner method for arranging the pairing of A1-signal
nd A2-outcome activity is feature-negative discrimination train-
ng [70,71,73]. Here some third stimulus, e.g., a light, is established
s a signal for food and the tone and light are presented as a com-
ound, which is not reinforced by food delivery (i.e. Light → Food,
Tone + Light] → nothing).
There are important parallels between SOP and its better-
nown relative, the Rescorla and Wagner model [19]. The Rescorla
nd Wagner model describes the notional changes in associa-
ive strength between the representations of a pair of events
n any particular trial, by the expression, V = ˛ˇ( − V). In
articular, the change in associative strength (V) is proportional
o the difference in the maximum level of associative strengthrain Research 285 (2015) 1–9
(asymptote, ) and the sum total of each previous associative
change (V) multiplied by the product of a pair of learning-rate
parameters (  ˛ and ˇ) that are associated with the two  events and
where 1 ≥  ˛ > 0 and 1 ≥  ˇ > 0. During Pavlovian conditioning, each
signalled outcome presentation will be less surprising than the
last; this is captured by increases in V, producing a decline in the
term ( − V), which results in increasingly small increments in
V, yielding a negatively accelerating learning curve. SOP shares
this property, which is achieved differently through associative
priming (Section 3.3). On the ﬁrst trial the signal and outcome’s
conjoint A1 activity will be good and this will increase excitatory
strength between them. On the next trial the signal’s excitatory
strength will prime the outcome. The associative priming will be
weak on the second trial but it will allow some overlap of the sig-
nal’s A1 elements and the outcome’s A2 elements (Fig. 3). Outcome
elements that are not primed will be free to enter their A1 states on
the second trial and this will produce some excitation. The ratio of
excitation to inhibition will decrease as V increases on each trial
and V  will reach asymptote () and at this point changes in exci-
tation and inhibition are equal on each trial. Thus the Rescorla and
Wagner model and SOP account for competition for a ﬁxed quota
of associative strength in the same way and this principle extends
to other key associative phenomena such as blocking [64,65], super
conditioning [74] and relatively validity [63]. SOP may  be seen as
a more complete model than Rescorla and Wagner’s because it
operates in real time [75,76] and anticipates latent inhibition and
its context speciﬁcity [77], some perceptual learning phenomena
[78], and modulation of UCS processing [76,79].
3.4. Decay priming and object recognition
The conclusions of this and the following section are summari-
sed in Fig. 4.
It may  already be obvious that the learning process describedoccur in spontaneous object recognition: At shorter retention intervals object P’s
elements are likely to be primed by decay from their recent A1 states, whereas at
longer retention intervals priming is likely to be the result of the operation of a con-
text  → object association. Decay and associative priming are, respectively, likely to
be  key mechanisms of relative recency and object-in-context.
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one, and composed of elements corresponding to multiple sensory
omains, the same processes can be applied.
.4.1. Spontaneous object recognition
The rodent’s initial encounter with object P during spontaneous
bject recognition will generate A1 activity in the representational
lements that provoke strong approach behaviour. After some time
his behaviour will weaken, corresponding to the object-P ele-
ents’ entry into their A2 state. Test presentation during this time
ould result in the standard bias towards exploration of the novel
bject, Q because its representational elements can pass freely from
heir inactive states to their A1 states whereas the elements of P that
re still in the A2-state cannot.
.4.2. Relative recency
We  noted above (Section 2.2) that spontaneous object recogni-
ion performance worsens when a retention interval is interpolated
etween the pre-exposure and testing [50–52]. One of SOP’s expla-
ations of this is that longer retention intervals allow a greater
roportion of P’s elements to return from their A2 to their inac-
ive states. Thus, on test, both P’s and Q’s inactive elements can
ass directly to their A1 states where they can elicit similar, strong
evels of approach. Demonstrations of relative recency [13,26–31]
eceive an identical explanation from SOP: The pre-exposure of P
nd then of Q will elicit A1 activity in their elements that will, over
ime, decay to A2 and then inactive states. Because P is pre-exposed
efore Q it is possible to arrange for testing with P and Q at a time
hen P’s elements tend to be inactive but Q’s elements remain in
heir A2 states. Here P’s elements are free to enter their A1 states
here they elicit strong approach; but many of Q’s elements may
emain in their A2 states and only weak approach is elicited.
.4.3. Object-in-context
The most natural SOP account of object-in-context learning is
escribed fully below (Section 3.5.1) and relies on the operation
f associations between each context and the object that has been
re-exposed in it (i.e., x → P and y → Q). Testing in context x will
rime object P’s elements but not object Q’s. Thus the presence of
 and Q on test in x will allow Q’s elements to enter their A1 states
rom their inactive states, where they can elicit relatively strong
pproach; but P’s primed elements will remain in their A2 state,
nable to elicit such responding.
Although such associative-priming processes seem plausible, it
s important also to consider possible decay-priming processes in
bject-in-context learning. The temporal asymmetries described
or relative recency are also possible in object-in-context learning
hen a single trial of each type is used: Here there are two  possi-
le sequences for the object and context pre-exposures (i.e., either
P, yQ or yQ, xP). Of course, this is precisely the arrangement of
bject pre-exposure in a relative recency experiment, and so SOP
nticipates that the ﬁrst-pre-exposed object will provoke strongest
pproach, based on decay priming. The associative-priming mech-
nism predicts greater approach of Q than of P on test in context
, in which it is unexpected. Thus, decay- and associative-priming
ill oppose one another (i.e., weakening discrimination) but pull in
he same direction (i.e., enhancing discrimination) with the yQ, xP
re-exposure sequence. We  have recently found evidence of such
nteractions between associative and decay priming (Tam, Bonardi,
 Robinson, report under review).
Although decay priming appears to inﬂuence performance in
bject-in-context learning, it cannot adequately account for it.
here are two reasons for this statement: First, in experiments
n which only a single xP and yQ trial is given [33–38], object-
n-context learning is detected when performance over the two
ossible pre-exposure sequences is collapsed. That is, although dif-
erences in decay priming appear to operate, they will assist andrain Research 285 (2015) 1–9 5
hinder discrimination performance in equal measure over both pre-
exposure sequences. The fact that test discrimination is successful
implies the operation of a second process over and above decay
priming; second, it is possible to arrange multiple pre-exposure
trials so that for each rat, on average, objects P and Q have been
presented equally recently before testing. This is achieved by pre-
senting xP and yQ pre-exposures multiple times, e.g., xP, yQ, yQ, xP
for half of the subjects and yQ, xP, xP, yQ for the remainder and also
results in object-in-context learning [32].
Thus, it appears that decay priming is required to explain rela-
tive recency but cannot accommodate object-in-context learning.
Decay priming could also explain spontaneous object recognition.
3.5. Associative priming and object recognition
3.5.1. Spontaneous object recognition
Brandon et al. anticipate a second, association-based source
of spontaneous object recognition: Context cues enter into excit-
atory associations with object P’s representational elements during
object P’s pre-exposure (see, e.g., [18,21,43]). Thus, context cues
will generate A2 activity (but not A1 activity) in object P’s repre-
sentational elements on testing. As with the decay-based source
of performance, the associative source is based on the elements
for object A tending to be in their A2 states, while those for object
Q tend to be in their A1 state at the point of testing. Thus it seems
that both associative and decay priming could support spontaneous
object recognition.
3.5.2. Relative recency
In the case of relative recency, any such context → P association
will be matched by a context → Q association and so test discrim-
ination cannot obviously be accounted for by associative priming.
However, non-reinforcement of a signal may extinguish excitatory
learning [80,81] and follows SOP’s rules (i.e., the non-reinforced
signal will elicit A2 activity in the outcome’s representation that
will generate inhibitory associative learning). Thus any context → P
association could undergo extinction during the subsequent pairing
of the context with Q, during which P is absent. Thus test per-
formance could be based entirely on associative priming because,
during testing, the context will be better associated with Q than
with P. This will produce better priming of Q than of P, leading to the
observed difference: greater approach of P than Q. However, studies
show that multiple non-reinforced trials are necessary to achieve
appreciable extinction [80,81] – unlike the single trial necessary for
relative recency. Thus, although an associative priming account of
relative recency is logically possible it is empirically improbable,
and this indicates decay priming as the sole source of performance.
3.5.3. Object-in-context
The most direct evidence for the operation of context → object
associative priming comes from object-in-context tasks [32–38].
As we  noted above (Section 3.4.3), accounts of object-in-context
learning based on decay priming are implausible and so, by elim-
ination, the associative priming account seems the most realistic
component of the SOP model available to explain performance.
3.6. Conclusions about the roles of decay and associative priming
in object recognition
We are left with the conclusion that associative priming is nec-
essary to explain object-in-context learning, but that it cannot fully
accommodate relative recency. This is the complementary arrange-
ment to that of decay priming: Decay priming appears necessary
to explain relative recency but is unlikely to account for object-in-
context learning. Spontaneous object recognition is unusual in that
it could operate by either form of priming. Perhaps, by modelling
6 oural Brain Research 285 (2015) 1–9
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Fig. 5. Spaced and massed pre-exposure illumination. Schematic of Whitt and
Robinson’s [44] multi-trial pre-exposure in spontaneous object recognition. Rats
were presented with object P during pre-exposure, which was only visible during
eight 30-s periods of illuminations–contexts were otherwise darkened. The periods J. Robinson, C. Bonardi / Behavi
arameters (timing, stimulus duration, etc.), we could manipulate
he mix  of decay and associative priming in spontaneous object
ecognition. But the unavoidable conclusion is that, according to
OP’s analysis, spontaneous object recognition is an imprecise tool
nd is unsuitable for understanding separable psychological pro-
esses. The mixed ﬁndings on the effects of hippocampus lesions
n rats’ spontaneous object recognition (cf. [23,40,50] and [22,39])
ay  be explicable if it is assumed, say, that associative priming
s dependent on the hippocampus and is more prominent in the
rocedures of those ﬁnding lesion effects than those who  have not
cf. [18]). This logic applies to other manipulations, of course: For
xample, extension of the retention interval between pre-exposure
nd test will have a devastating effect on spontaneous object recog-
ition that is largely dependent on decay priming, but one based
argely on associative priming will be unaffected. But the discussion
ere implies that relative recency and object-in-context learning
re relatively selective tools for examining decay and associative
riming respectively.
Spontaneous object recognition has been described as a form of
abituation (7], see also, [8,9]) – that is, a decline in the behaviour
hat is elicited by a stimulus when it is presented repeatedly or over
 long period of time. In the case of spontaneous object recognition
he stimulus is object, P and the measured response is approach
r exploratory behaviour. The decline in this behaviour may  be
ssumed to occur during preexposure but is measured in the test
elative to object Q. The stimulus speciﬁcity shown here meets a key
eature of habituation. Several authors have noted that habituation
an be understood as the result of a decline in the efﬁcacy of the
athway between a stimulus and response [82]. It is quite possible
hat simple, stimulus-response based adaptive process may  occur
longside those anticipated by SOP. One implication of this is that
eural manipulations may  affect SOP-based processes and spare
timulus-response based processes (e.g., [8,9,58]), or vice versa.
Sokolov ([83], see also [84,85]) described a model of habitu-
tion in which the presentation of a new stimulus will lead to
he development of a representation of it. Prolonged or repeated
resentation of the stimulus will foster increasing detail of that
epresentation until it is entirely accurate. The process of repre-
entational modiﬁcation is assumed to be the result of a mismatch
n memory – that is the stimulus is compared with sets of stimu-
us representations in memory. When comparison ﬁnds a match,
o representational modiﬁcation is required; when comparison
ails to ﬁnd a match a new representation is assembled (or a close
atch is improved). In an habituation procedure, improvements in
timulus representation will be associated with declines in uncon-
itioned response (i.e., habituation). Like Sokolov’s model, the SOP
odel [15] allows for the assembly of stimulus representations –
hen their elements are concurrently in their A1 states – but no
dditional process of comparison takes place. Rather, changes in
esponsiveness to repeatedly presented stimuli are based solely on
he priming principles outlined above.
. Evidence of associative processes in object recognition
We  have seen that SOP can be applied to standard demonstra-
ions of object recognition. Of course, the mere fact that this model
ts the data does not demand that the model should be accepted.
e next describe some evidence from analytical object recognition
xperiments that make a stronger case for this position.
.1. Enhanced spontaneous object recognition when multiple
re-exposures are spaced
We  saw that spontaneous object recognition test perfor-
ance could be the result of object P’s representational elementsof  darkness differed across two conditions, being either 4-min (spaced condition)
or  30-s (massed condition). Subsequent discrimination (greater approach to object
Q  than object P) was superior in the spaced condition than in the massed condition.
becoming primed through a mix  of decay and associative priming,
which may  vary according to the precise experimental parame-
ters (e.g., the pre-exposure-test retention interval). To the extent
that associative priming is involved in test performance, it will be
important to maximise the strength of the context → object associ-
ation during pre-exposure. As we  saw above (Section 3.3), learning
about the context → object relationship will occur only when the
context’s representational elements are in their A1 states, and the
valence of this learning (i.e., whether it is excitatory or inhibitory)
will depend on the activity state of the object’s representational
elements: When they are in their A1 states the association will be
strengthened through additional excitation, but the association will
be weakened by inhibition when they are in their A2 states.
Such weakening of the context → object association is expected
when the object, P has been recently presented, as a result of decay-
based priming. Several authors have reported that when multiple
pre-exposures to object P are given, test performance is better when
these pre-exposures are relatively well-spaced (e.g., [20,44,86])
and we  have unpublished demonstrations of analogous effects in
human participants’ performance on an auditory recognition mem-
ory task. The pre-exposure schedule used by Whitt and Robinson is
represented in Fig. 5. To ensure full experimental control over stim-
ulus scheduling, objects P and Q were presented in glass cylinders,
rendering them entirely visual stimuli. All rats received eight, 30-s
periods of illumination during a single pre-exposure session, dur-
ing which time they remained in the context. Object P would only
have been visible during these periods of illumination. Rats’ test
performance following spaced pre-exposure, in which the inter-
val between each illumination period was 4 min, was superior to
that following massed pre-exposure, in which it was  only 30 s. Our
interpretation is that an appreciable proportion of the objects’ rep-
resentational elements returned to inactivity during the four-min
inter-illumination period and were available to enter their A1 states
on the subsequent period, thus supporting the formation of the
context → object association. However, the massed pre-exposure
trials occurred when P’s elements were more likely to be primed.
This will have produced some inhibitory x-P learning that would
act to offset the excitatory x-P learning upon which performance
partly relies.4.2. Decay priming in relative recency
The decay-priming analysis of relative recency (Section 3.4.2)
predicts that test performance will be highly dependent on the
J. Robinson, C. Bonardi / Behavioural Brain Research 285 (2015) 1–9 7
Fig. 6. Temporal manipulations in relative recency. Schematic of the temporal
manipulations in pre-exposure-trial and retention-interval spacing in two relative-
recency experiments. Rats in both experiments received sequential pre-exposure
trials with objects P and Q before testing with the two objects. Tam et al. used
a  ﬁve-min retention interval between pre-exposure to object Q and testing. The
duration of the interval between the two pre-exposure trials was  either 5 min  or
2  h; discrimination was  better with the longer interval. Mitchell and Laiacona ﬁxed
the  pre-exposure inter-trial interval (at 1 h) and manipulated the retention interval.
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Fig. 7. Schematic of primed object-in-context. Schematic of an object-in-context
experiment (e.g., Whitt, Haselgrove, & Robinson) in which the three stages of the
experiment occur from left to right. The procedure began with rats receiving pre-
exposure to object P in context x and with pre-exposure to object Q in context y,
as  in the standard object-in-context task. Next rats were placed in context x; no
object was present but this treatment should be sufﬁcient to allow the associative
priming of object P. In the subsequent test, rats were presented with both objects,est discrimination was  good at retention intervals of 24 h or less, but was  absent
t  72-h intervals. Note: Mitchell and Laiacona included additional intervals, which
re not summarised here.
uration of the inter-trial intervals. For example, with a sufﬁ-
iently short retention interval (i.e., the time between the ﬁnal
re-exposure and testing), the interval between pre-exposure to
 and Q becomes crucial in ensuring that P’s elements are largely
nactive by test. Tam, Robinson, Jennings, and Bonardi [87] have
onﬁrmed this prediction of SOP in a design that is summarised in
ig. 6. They presented rats with pairs of objects, P and Q, with a ﬁve-
in  interval between Q and the test. In one condition the interval
etween P and Q was also 5 min, and in another 2 h. The 2-h P-Q
nterval produced markedly stronger discrimination than the ﬁve-
in  P-Q interval. Tam et al. demonstrated that this time-related
eduction in performance was not a general deﬁcit, by showing
 variant of object-in-context learning to remain unaffected by a
imilar manipulation of the interval between training and test. It is
lso notable that the analysis of object-in-context learning (Section
.5.1) anticipates this insensitivity because the associative priming
n which it relies will be unaffected by changes in the passage of
ime.
A related prediction is that relative recency should also be abol-
shed by an extension of the retention interval (i.e., the interval
etween the second pre-exposure trial and test). When sufﬁciently
ong, the retention interval will allow the elements of both P and
 to become inactive so that, on test, A1 activity in both may  be
enerated and similar levels of approach elicited. Mitchell and Laia-
ona [29] report just such a ﬁnding. Rats in three groups received
re-exposure to object P before object Q, which was  separated by
 1-h interval. Test approach of Q was greater than P when test-
ng occurred immediately after the pre-exposure to P, but with
he interpolation of a 72-h retention interval test performance was
ttenuated. However, one feature of Mitchell and Laiacona’s results
s problematic for SOP: Relative recency discrimination was seen
lso in a group with a 24-h retention interval. In order to explain
his pattern of results the analysis of relative recency outlined in
ection 3.4.2 needs to assume that P’s elements have decayed to
nactivity at 25 h, but that at 24 h Q’s remain largely primed in their
2 states. While this is not impossible, it could be seen as a sur-
rising coincidence; given their potential theoretical signiﬁcance,
itchell and Laiacona’s ﬁndings would beneﬁt from conﬁrmation
nd further analysis.P  and Q, but in a third context, z, which was associated with neither object. On test,
rats  approached Q in preference to P despite testing not occurring in P’s context, x.
Performance is consistent with the priming mechanisms.
4.3. Associative priming of object-in-context learning
The current analysis of object-in-context learning (Section 3.5.3;
see Fig. 3) relies on the associative priming of object P by the test
context, x. This priming of P usually occurs during the rodents’
placement in context x at test. However, according to the analy-
sis suggested here, this is not necessary: The only requirement is
that x is primed at the time that x and y are tested. In order to
examine this suggestion Whitt Haselgrove and Robinson [43] used
the procedure summarised in Fig. 7. Exactly as in a standard object-
in-context learning task, rats were initially presented with object
P in context x and object Q in context y, to allow the establishment
of x → P and y → Q associations. In a subsequent stage rats were
placed in context x, but this contained no objects. This stage was
intended to associatively activate object P’s representation, and this
priming was assumed to remain appreciable over the short time
before testing. Unlike standard object-in-context learning, testing
with objects P and Q occurred in a third context (e.g., z) in which
no objects had been experienced. Despite this change in procedure,
and consistent with SOP, rats approach was biased towards object
Q relative to object P.
5. Discussion
We have attempted to apply the associative model of memory,
SOP [16–18] to three representative forms of object recogni-
tion that are popular procedures in experimental psychology
and behavioural neuroscience. In considering its dynamic pro-
cesses (decay and associative priming) and its rules for association
formation, SOP produced a satisfactory account of object mem-
ory. Experimental evidence [20,43,44,88] largely, though not
universally (Section 4.2) supported SOP’s account’s of object
recognition.We touched brieﬂy on alternative accounts of object recognition
memory. For example, it has been suggested that object-in-context
memory may  reﬂect mnemonic processes like those in human
episodic memory (e.g., [14]) and that relative recency may involve
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 higher form of temporal memory (e.g., [13]). There is nothing in
he preceding discussion to inform on the status of these intriguing
nd important possibilities but they are probably more complex
xplanations that are required to explain available ﬁndings. More
roubling for such accounts is that the evidence described here sup-
orts direct predictions from SOP. It is possible of course that these
ndings could also be interpreted in terms of more sophisticated
emory systems, though it is unclear to us how this could be done
nd it is probably unnecessary to do so. Being based on a large
ody of experimental evidence from the study of habituation and
avlovian conditioning, SOP can be used to deliver several testable
reas of experimentation that could further evaluate this account
f recognition memory.
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